

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 00257 01 OF 04 301346Z

51

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2671

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 SALT TWO GENEVA 257

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: STATEMENTS BY DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV, GENERAL TRUSOV,
ACADEMICIAN SHCHUKIN AND GENERAL BELETSKY, JULY 29, 1975
(SALT TWO-699)

THE FOLLOWING ARE STATEMENTS DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER
SEMENOV, GENERAL TRUSOV, ACADEMICIAN SHCHUKIN AND GENERAL
BELETSKY AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF JULY 29, 1975.

QUOTE:

SEMENOV STATEMENT, JULY 29, 1975

TODAY WE WILL ADDRESS THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN DEFINING THE
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO BE LIMITED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT.

ON JULY 9, 1975, ACTING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS, THE USSR
DELEGATION SUBMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION NEW WORDING FOR THE DEFINI-
TIONS OF THE SYSTEMS TO BE LIMITED. WE DID NOT ELABORATE ON
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SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00257 01 OF 04 301346Z

THE PROPOSALS TABLED, WITH A VIEW TO GIVING THE OTHER SIDE AN

OPPORTUNITY TO STUDY THE TEXT THEREOF WITH ALL THE THOROUGHNESS THIS WHILE QUESTION DESERVES. AS A RESULT OF THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS HELD BETWEEN THE SIDES IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING WAS ACHIEVED REGARDING THE ADVISABILITY OF INCLUDING IN THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT DEFINITIONS FOR THE STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES TO BE LIMITED, AND ON CONCENTRATING THESE DEFINITIONS WITHIN A SEPARATE ARTICLE.

THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET SIDE IS IN LINE WITH THIS MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. IT IS FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974, AND AT THE SAME TIME TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS PRIOR TO THE WORKING RECESS. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT IT CONSTITUTES A GOOD BASIS FOR WORKING OUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE UNDERSTANDING.

THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT MUST CONTAIN DEFINITIONS OF THOSE STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES, WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF WHICH THE SIDES WILL ASSUME OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE AGREEMENT. DEFINITIONS OF ANY OTHER SYSTEM IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW AGREEMENT WOULD BE SUPERFLUOUS. AN UNAMBIGUOUS ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF SPECIFICALLY WHICH SYSTEMS MUST BE DEFINED IN THE NEW AGREEMENT IS GIVEN IN THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974, WHICH SPECIFIES THAT LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS, HEAVY BOMBERS AND AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS WHEN BOMBERS ARE EQUIPPED WITH THEM ARE TO BE LIMITED WITHIN THE 2,400 AGGREGATE. ACCORDING TO THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE SIDES, BASED ON THE PROVISIONS OF THE AID-MEMOIRE, THE 1,320 AGGREGATE IS TO INCLUDE ICBM LAUNCHERS AND SLBM LAUNCHERS WITH MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS.

AND IT IS PRECISELY THESE STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY SYSTEMS WHICH ARE DEFINED IN THE SOVIET SIDE'S JULY 9, 1975 PROPOSAL.

A MOST IMPORTANT REQUIREMENT WITH RESPECT TO DEFINITIONS OF THE SYSTEMS TO BE LIMITED MUST BE STRICT CONFORMANCE OF
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 00257 01 OF 04 301346Z

THE WORDING BEING WORKED OUT TO THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY. ANY DEPARTURE FROM THIS AGREED PRINCIPLE WOULD RESULT IN CONSEQUENCES WHICH ARE NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE INTERESTS OF THE MATTER AT HAND.

CONSIDERING THE IMPORTANCE OF DEFINING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN THE CONTEXT OF PREPARING A JOINT DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, THE USSR DELEGATION BELIEVES IT ADVISABLE

TO EXPOSE THIS PROBLEM TO DISCUSSION AT DELEGATION MEETINGS, SO THAT THOSE MEMBERS OF DELEGATIONS WHO ARE SPECIALISTS IN THE RESPECTIVE AREAS COULD TAKE AN ACTIVE PART IN SUCH DISCUSSION. THIS WILL CONTRIBUTE TO SPECIFIC SUBSTANTIVE CONSIDERATION OF THE RELEVANT QUESTIONS AND WILL PROVIDE THE NECESSARY IMPETUS FOR A BUSINESSLIKE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN TERMS OF SEEKING WAYS OF BRINGING THE POSITIONS OF THE SIDES CLOSER TOGETHER AND REACHING MUTUALLY AGREED SOLUTIONS.

A DISCUSSION OF DEFINITIONS AT THE LEVEL OF DELEGATIONS WILL GIVE OUR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THIS QUESTION AN EVEN MORE RESPONSIBLE AND PURPOSEFUL CHARACTER ON THE BASIS OF THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDING AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL; THIS IS MOST IMPORTANT IN VIEW OF THE MAGNITUDE OF OUR ASSIGNED TASK. IN ENTERING INTO A DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION WE ARE NOT STARTING FROM SCRATCH. OUR DISCUSSIONS WERE PRECEDED BY MUCH INTENSIVE WORK PRIOR TO THE WORKING RECESS, INCLUDING WORK IN THE AD HOC GROUP OF TRUSOV AND ROWNY, WHERE AT ONE TIME IT APPEARED THAT MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING WAS EMERGING WITH RESPECT TO A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WHICH THUS FAR REMAIN UNAGREED. THE SOVIET DELEGATION EXPECTS THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION AT THE LEVEL OF DELEGATIONS WILL HELP US ARRIVE AT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PROVISIONS WHICH COULD COMPRISE THE TEXT OF THE ARTICLE OF THE JOINT DRAFT I REFERRED TO AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS STATEMENT.

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PAGE 01 SALT T 00257 02 OF 04 301456Z

53

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 4 SALT TWO GENEVA 257

EXDIS/SALT

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

TRUSOV STATEMENT, JULY 29, 1975

IT CAN BE SEEN FROM THE STATEMENTS OF THE DELEGATIONS, AND IN PARTICULAR FROM THE JULY 7, 1975 STATEMENTS OF THE U.S. DELEGATION, THAT THERE IS A COMMON UNDERSTANDING TO THE EFFECT THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974, THE LIMITATION TO AN AGGREGATE LEVEL NOT TO EXCEED 2,400 UNITS APPLIES TO LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS, HEAVY BOMBERS AND AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS WHEN BOMBERS ARE EQUIPPED WITH THEM.

AS YOU KNOW, THE DEFINITION OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS WAS WORKED OUT IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLE I OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, WHICH ACCORDING TO THE AIDE-MEMOIRE IS TO BE INCORPORATED IN THE NEW AGREEMENT. A CORRESPONDING PROVISION IS RECORDED IN ARTICLE IV, PARA. 1, OF THE JOINT DOCUMENT OF MAY 7, 1975.

INASMUCH AS THE VERY CONCEPT OF SUCH LAUNCHERS DOES NOT IN ANY WAY CHANGE IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00257 02 OF 04 301456Z

WORKED OUT, RETENTION IN THE NEW AGREEMENT OF THE DEFINITION OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, WHICH IS CURRENTLY IN EFFECT, WOULD ALSO BE MOST NATURAL.

IN THE COURSE OF PAST DISCUSSIONS THE U.S. DELEGATION EXPRESSED A CONSIDERATION REGARDING THE ADVISABILITY OF GIVING GREATER PRECISION TO THE CONCEPT OF THE SHORTEST DISTANCE BETWEEN THE NORTHWESTERN BORDER OF THE CONTINENTAL USSR AND THE NORTHEASTERN BORDER OF THE CONTINENTAL U.S. BY INDICATING A SPECIFIC DISTANCE IN KILOMETERS. THE PROPOSALS TABLED BY THE SOVIET SIDE ON JULY 9, 1975 TAKE THIS CONSIDERATION OF THE U.S. SIDE INTO ACCOUNT.

WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFINITION OF SLBM LAUNCHERS, THE U.S. DELEGATION EXPRESSED THE CONSIDERATION THAT THIS DEFINITION SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL THE EXISTING OPERATIVE DOCUMENTS ON THIS SCORE. THE SOVIET SIDE HAS STUDIED THESE CONSIDERATIONS, AND IN THE SLBM LAUNCHER DEFINITION TABLED ON JULY 9, 1975 FULLY TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND THE PROTOCOL THERETO, OF THE PROTOCOL OF JULY 24, 1972 AND THE SCC PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES OF JULY 3, 1974. I.E. OF ALL THOSE DOCUMENTS WHICH HAVE A

BEARING ON THIS MATTER AND WHICH WERE MENTIONED BY THE U.S. DELEGATION.

DURING DISCUSSIONS OF DEFINITIONS OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS AND SLBM LAUNCHERS IN THE AD HOC GROUP OF TRUSOV AND ROWNY PRIOR TO THE WORKING RECESS, A CERTAIN CONVERGENCE OF POSITIONS HAD APPEARED TO EMERGE. IN PARTICULAR, THIS COULD BE SEEN FROM THE DOCUMENT HANDED OVER BY GENERAL ROWNY ON APRIL 16, 1975. SUBSEQUENTLY, HOWEVER, THINGS EVOLVED IN A WAY WHICH REMAINS UNCLEAR; THERE WAS MOVEMENT, BUT IT WAS MOVEMENT BACK TO STARTING POSITIONS.

THE U.S. DELEGATION PROPOSES SEPARATE DEFINITIONS FOR LAND-BASED ICBMS, SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND FOR THEIR LAUNCHERS. SUCH AN APPROACH IN NO WAY ENSUES FROM THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OR FROM THE OPERATIVE DOCUMENTS ON THIS SCORE WHICH WERE ADOPTED BY BOTH SIDES. TO DEFINE LAND-BASED ICBMS AND THEIR LAUNCHERS SEPARATELY WOULD CONFLICT IN SUBSTANCE AND IN FORM WITH THOSE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 00257 02 OF 04 301456Z

AGREEMENT, WHICH ACCORDING TO THE AIDE-MEMOIRE MUST BE INCORPORATED IN THE NEW AGREEMENT. THE DEFINITIONS OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS, PROPOSED BY THE U.S. DELEGATION, CONTAIN UNCERTAINTIES OF THE KIND WHICH, IF ADOPTED, COULD TRANSFORM AGREED DEFINITIONS OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS AND SLBM LAUNCHERS, WHICH DO NOT GIVE RISE TO ANY DOUBTS, INTO SOMETHING WHICH, DURING THE TERM OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, COULD ONLY LEAD TO DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE SIDES, WHICH ARE COMPLETELY UNWARRANTED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE BUSINESS AT HAND.

INDEED, WHAT WOULD IT MEAN TO DEFINE AN ICBM LAUNCHER AS ANY DEVICE OR EQUIPMENT WHICH CAN BE USED FOR LAUNCHING AN ICBM? WHAT IS THE OBJECTIVE CRITERION OF WHETHER OR NOT SOME DEVICE OR OTHER CAN BE USED FOR LAUNCHING AN ICBM? SUCH A DEFINITION INVOLVES A SUBJECTIVE APPROACH TO ASSESSING

THE POSSIBILITY OF USING SOME DEVICE OR OTHER, OR SOME PIECE OF EQUIPMENT, FOR LAUNCHING AN ICBM. THIS COULD LEAD TO WHERE IT MIGHT SUDDENLY OCCUR TO ONE OF THE SIDES TO CLASSIFY, SAY, MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILE LAUNCHERS OR LAUNCHERS OF GEOPHYSICAL ROCKETS, OR SOMETHING ELSE, AS AN ICBM LAUNCHER, MERELY BECAUSE IT IMAGINES THAT THESE LAUNCHERS OR DEVICES CAN BE USED FOR LAUNCHING AN ICBM.

THE SAME ALSO APPLIES TO THE U.S. PROPOSED DEFINITION OF AN SLBM LAUNCHER AS ANY DEVICE OR EQUIPMENT WHICH CAN BE USED FOR LAUNCHING AN SLBM. THE SAME UNCERTAINTY AND THE SAME SUBJECTIVISM.

FURTHERMORE, IN THINKING THIS DEFINITION THROUGH, ONE GETS THE IMPRESSION THAT ITS AUTHORS HAD IN MIND NOT ONLY BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS ON THOSE SUBMARINES WHOSE LAUNCHERS, ACCORDING TO THE EXISTING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, MUST BE COUNTED IN THE OVERALL AGGREGATE LEVEL, BUT ALSO SOME SORT OF DEVICES OR EQUIPMENT WHICH IN THEIR VIEW COULD BE USED FOR LAUNCHING AN ALBM.

THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT IS MUCH TOO SERIOUS AND RESPONSIBLE A DOCUMENT TO PERMIT IT TO CONTAIN COMPLETELY UNJUSTIFIED AMBIGUITIES AND UNCERTAINTIES.

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SECRET

PAGE 04 SALT T 00257 02 OF 04 301456Z

ALREADY NOW THE SIDES HAVE--AND THE EXPERIENCE OF THE SCC FULLY BEARS THIS OUT--A COMPLETELY PRECISE UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT CONSTITUTES A LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHER AND AN SLBM LAUNCHER.

THERE ARE SOMETIMES STATEMENTS MADE HERE TO THE EFFECT THAT IT IS UNCLEAR WHY THE USSR DELEGATION DOES NOT LIKE THE U.S. DELEGATION'S PROPOSAL FOR SEPARATE DEFINITIONS, AND THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION DOES NOT GIVE UP HOPE OF CONVINCING US THAT ITS DEFINITIONS ARE BETTER THAN THOSE PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE.

IN THIS CONNECTION I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT THE DEFINITION FOR A LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHER, PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE, IS A DEFINITION WHICH HAS BEEN ADOPTED BY BOTH SIDES AND WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL OCTOBER 3, 1977. THE SLBM LAUNCHER DEFINITION FOLLOWS COMPLETELY FROM THE BILATERAL DOCUMENTS I CITED ABOVE, WHICH WILL ALSO REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL OCTOBER 3, 1977.

THEREFORE, IT IS NOT A MATTER OF LIKE OR DISLIKE, BUT OF THE EXISTENCE OF COMPLETELY PRECISE DEFINITIONS WHICH HAVE STOOD THE TEST OF EXPERIENCE, AND ANY ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE AMENDMENTS GIVING RISE TO AMBIGUITIES AND UNCERTAINTIES ARE BY NO MEANS HELPFUL.

THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES THAT THE PROPOSALS TABLED ON JULY 9, 1975 ON DEFINITIONS OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS AND SLBM LAUNCHERS ARE FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE OBJECTIVES AND TASKS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, WITH THE AIDE-MEMOIRE AS WELL AS THE OTHER SOVIET-AMERICAN DOCUMENTS IN FORCE, WHICH BEAR ON THIS QUESTION.

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PAGE 01 SALT T 00257 03 OF 04 301359Z

51

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 4 SALT TWO GENEVA 257

EXDIS/SALT

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SHCUKIN STATEMENT, JULY 29, 1975

I INTEND TO PROVIDE SOME CLARIFICATIONS CONCERNING THE DEFINITION OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS AND SLBM LAUNCHERS WITH MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES, WHICH WAS TABLED BY THE USSR DELEGATION ON JULY 9, 1975.

I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE FIRST OF ALL THAT A CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF SUCH LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS AND SLBM LAUNCHERS IS THAT THEY CONTAIN BALLISTIC MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS.

IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES OF ANY TYPE CONSIST OF TWO OR MORE REENTRY VEHICLES. THIS IS WHAT DIFFERENTIATES THEM FROM SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLES. THIS DIFFERENCE IS CLEARLY REFLECTED IN THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON THE DEFINITION OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS AND SLBM LAUNCHERS WITH MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS.

MORE COMPLEX ARE THE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES WHICH
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00257 03 OF 04 301359Z

DISTINGUISH MIRVS FROM MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES OF OTHER TYPES.

CHARACTERISTIC FOR MIRVS IS THE CAPABILITY OF THEIR REENTRY VEHICLES TO CARRY OUT AN APPROPRIATE MANEUVER ONLY IF THE FRONT ENDS (IN A SELF-CONTAINED DISPENSING MECHANISM) OR THE REENTRY VEHICLES THEMSELVES HAVE DEVICES WHICH PROVIDE FOR INDIVIDUAL AIMING.

THE FORMULATION PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE IS DESIGNED SPECIFICALLY TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE CLEARLY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE CONCEPTS OF MIRVS ON THE ONE HAND, AND MRVS WHICH ARE NOT INDIVIDUALLY TARGETABLE, ON THE OTHER.

THE BASIC CONSIDERATIONS WHICH GUIDED THE SOVIET SIDE IN PROVIDING DEFINITIONS OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS AND SLBM LAUNCHERS WITH MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

CONSISTENT WITH THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, THIS DEFINITION DEALS WITH LAUNCHERS, RATHER THAN MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLE SYSTEMS, FOR IT IS NOT "SYSTEMS" THAT ARE TO BE LIMITED, BUT CORRESPONDING LAUNCHERS.

FURTHER: INDIVIDUAL TARGETING IS CHARACTERIZED NOT ONLY BY WHETHER REENTRY VEHICLES ARE AIMED AT POINTS SEPARATED BOTH DOWN-RANGE AND CROSS-RANGE. THE MAIN THING CONSISTS IN THE CAPABILITY OF REENTRY VEHICLES, AFTER SEPARATION FROM THE BOOSTER ROCKET, TO CARRY OUT APPROPRIATE MANEUVERS WITH THE AID OF DEVICES DESIGNED FOR THAT PURPOSE, AS SPECIFIED IN THE SOVIET PROPOSAL OF JULY 9, 1975.

THE WORDING OF THE DEFINITION OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS AND SLBM LAUNCHERS WITH MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS, WHICH WAS TABLED BY THE SOVIET SIDE, FULLY DESCRIBES THOSE LAUNCHERS WHOSE NUMBER ON EACH SIDE, ACCORDING TO THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974, MUST NOT EXCEED 1,320.

BELETSKY STATEMENT, JULY 29, 1975

CONTINUING TO ELABORATE ON THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE
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SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 00257 03 OF 04 301359Z

SOVIET DELEGATION TODAY, I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS THE DEFINITIONS OF HEAVY BOMBERS AND AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS.

APPROPRIATE RATIONALE CONCERNING DEFINITIONS OF THESE TWO TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS HAS BEEN SET FORTH BY THE USSR DELEGATION IN THE COURSE OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS, AND THIS IS IN THE FIELD OF VISION OF THE U.S. SIDE.

NOW I INTEND TO EXPRESS ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THESE DEFINITIONS.

A COMPARISON OF THE HEAVY BOMBER DEFINITIONS PRESENTLY ON THE NEGOTIATION TABLE SHOWS THAT THERE ARE CERTAIN COINCIDING ELEMENTS IN THE PROPOSALS OF THE SIDES.

THE SIDES AGREE THAT B-52, B-1, TUPOLEV-95 AND MYASISH-CHEV AIRCRAFT ARE INCLUDED AMONG HEAVY BOMBERS. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THE POSITIONS OF THE SIDES ARE ALSO CLOSE ON FUTURE RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF INCLUDING NEW AIRCRAFT BEING OR TO BE DEVELOPED, WITH CHARACTERISTICS COMPARABLE OR SUPERIOR TO THESE HEAVY BOMBERS, AMONG THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO BE LIMITED.

THE EXISTENCE OF THESE PROVISIONS, WHICH COINCIDE OR ARE CLOSE IN CONTENT, PROVIDES A BASIS FOR FURTHER WORK ON THE DEFINITION OF HEAVY BOMBERS.

NATURALLY, THIS WORK CAN BE SUCCESSFUL ONLY IF IT IS CONDUCTED ON A BASIS OF RECIPROCITY AND IN A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT.

IN CONNECTION WITH CONSIDERATION OF THE HEAVY BOMBER DEFINITION, ONE CANNOT FAIL TO MENTION THE ATTEMPTS TO INCLUDE IN THE CATEGORY OF SUCH AIRCRAFT THE SOVIET MEDIUM BOMBER CALLED BACKFIRE BY THE U.S. SIDE.

AS FOR THE STATEMENTS OF THE U.S. DELEGATION, EXCEPT FOR FORMAL ASSERTIONS, THEY DO NOT PROVIDE ANY KIND OF RATIONALE FOR THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE U.S. SIDE WITH RESPECT TO THIS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 SALT T 00257 03 OF 04 301359Z

AIRCRAFT. AND THIS IS UNDERSTANDABLE. OBJECTIVELY, SUCH RATIONALE DOES NOT EXIST.

IT SHOULD BE RECALLED THAT IN SOME OF THE ARGUMENTS HEARD HERE IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSIONS, ATTEMPTS WERE MADE, CLEARLY ON THE BASIS OF PRONOUNCEMENTS BY INDIVIDUAL OFFICIALS, IN THE U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT FOR EXAMPLE, TO INCLUDE BACKFIRE AIRCRAFT AMONG HEAVY BOMBERS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THESE AIRCRAFT, AFTER CARRYING OUT THEIR MISSION, ALLEGEDLY COULD

LAND ON THE TERRITORY OF SOME THIRD COUNTRIES.

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PAGE 01 SALT T 00257 04 OF 04 301429Z

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ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 4 SALT TWO GENEVA 257

EXDIS/SALT

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HERE A QUESTION INEVITABLY ARISES: WHY WAS IT NECESSARY, WITH RESPECT TO THE BACKFIRE AIRCRAFT, TO INTRODUCE SOME SORT OF ADDITIONAL, CLEARLY CONTRIVED HYPOTHETICAL CONDITIONS CONCERNING THEIR USE?

IT IS COMPLETELY UNFOUNDED TO LINK THE HEAVY BOMBER DEFINITION WITH THE CAPABILITY OF SOME AIRCRAFT OR OTHER TO FLY IN ONE DIRECTION ONLY, I.E., TO THE AREA WHERE IT CARRIES OUT ITS COMBAT MISSION, OR, FOR EXAMPLE, WITH ITS CAPABILITY OF AIR-REFUELING, AS CAN ALSO BE HEARD NOT INFREQUENTLY. IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE THAT SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD INEVITABLY LEAD TO AN EROSION OF THE BOUNDARIES OF OUR COMPREHENSION OF WHICH AIRCRAFT ARE IN FACT HEAVY BOMBERS. IF ONE WERE TO FOLLOW SUCH A ROAD, THEN MANY OTHER AIRCRAFT, TOO, WOULD HAVE TO BE INCLUDED AMONG SUCH BOMBERS, IN PARTICULAR, TACTICAL AIRCRAFT.

THUS, THE STANDPOINT EXPRESSED BY THE U.S. SIDE, IN PARTICULAR IN ITS JULY 7, 1975 STATEMENT, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE BACKFIRE AIRCRAFT IS A HEAVY BOMBER, IS COMPLETELY

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00257 04 OF 04 301429Z

GROUNDLESS. THIS AIRCRAFT IS A MEDIUM BOMBER, AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT. THE U.S. SIDE'S POSITION ON THIS QUESTION IS BASED ON A ONE-SIDED APPROACH AND IS CLEARLY IN CONFLICT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, WHICH LIES AT THE BASIS OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

ACCORDING TO THE DEFINITION PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE, AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS ARE ANY MISSILES OF THIS TYPE INSTALLED IN A BOMBER OR ON ITS EXTERNAL MOUNTINGS.

IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO SEE THAT THIS DEFINITION IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH SUBPARAGRAPH 2(A) OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, WHERE IT IS RECORDED THAT "WHEN A BOMBER IS EQUIPPED WITH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, EACH SUCH MISSILE WILL BE COUNTED AS ONE UNIT WITHIN THE OVERALL AGGREGATE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES (2,400)." IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT THIS FORMULATION PRECLUDES ANY KIND OF AMBIGUITY OR ARBITRARY INTERPRETATION.

HOWEVER, THE DEFINITION OF AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES PROPOSED BY THE U.S. SIDE IN THE JOINT DOCUMENT OF MAY 7 INCLUDES ONLY BALLISTIC MISSILES OF THIS TYPE. THEREBY AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES WITH THAT RANGE ARE REMOVED FROM THE LIMITATIONS. THIS IS CLEARLY INCONSISTENT WITH THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDING RECORDED IN THE CORRESPONDING PROVISIONS OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE. THE ASSUMPTIONS EXPRESSED IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSION, TO THE EFFECT THAT CRUISE MISSILES, ACCORDING TO THIS UNDERSTANDING, ARE NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN THE AGGREGATE LEVEL OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO BE LIMITED, ARE DEVOID OF ALL FOUNDATION.

INDEED, BOTH CRUISE AND BALLISTIC AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS ARE STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES. THEREFORE, THERE ARE AND CAN BE NO GROUNDS FOR TAKING DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THESE MISSILES OF ONE AND THE SAME TYPE AND EQUAL RANGE.

ATTEMPTS TO LINK THE QUESTION OF LIMITATIONS ON AIR-TO-SURFACE

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 00257 04 OF 04 301429Z

SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES WITH THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BOMBERS

IN PENETRATING AIR DEFENSES ARE UNFOUNDED. IT IS WELL KNOWN THA AIR DEFENSE QUESTIONS ARE IN NO WAY DEALT WITH IN THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING AND ARE NOT A SUBJECT OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS WHOSE OBJECTIVE IS TO WORK OUT QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN STRICT CONFORMITY WITH THE AIDE-MEMOIRE.

IT IS PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT THE EFFORTS OF CONSIDER THESE PROBLEMS, UNDERTAKEN BY THE U.S. DELEGATION IN ITS JULY 7, 1975 STATEMENT, ARE DEVOID OF ALL FOUNDATION.

IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS HELD, THE USSR DELEGATION SET FORTH THE RATIONALE FOR THE DEFINITION OF AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 MILOMETERS, TABLED BY THE SOVIET SIDE, AND REAFFIRMS ONCE AGAIN THAT IT IS FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDING, RECORDED IN THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, WHICH IS AT THE BASIS OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

UNQUOTE JOHNSON

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Draft Date: 30 JUL 1975
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Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
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Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975SALTT00257
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Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
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Film Number: D750263-0142
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